NOTICE COST PROBLEMS UNDER RULE
23(b)(3) AND (c)(2) AFTER OPPENHEIMER
FUND, INC. V SANDERS
Ordinarily, the plaintiffs in Rule 23(b)(3)1 class actions must bear
the initial cost of (c)(2)2 notice to the class Based on the assumption
that high notice costs discourage potential (b)(3) plaintiffs from bringing claims that are otherwise well-suited for class action status, numerous approaches have been suggested that would eliminate or minimize
this cost burden.' An analysis of these approaches in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Oppenheimer Fund,Inc. v. Sanders'

reveals that each has serious limitations and that, collectively, the various approaches will afford little relief to (b)(3) plaintiffs seeking to minimize the burden of (c)(2) notice costs. A recent proposal by a division
of the United States Department of Justice would replace the (b)(3) and
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin Reform of ClassAction LitigationProcedures: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Coma .
on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. 3475];
Advisory Committee' Note to ProposedRule 23, in JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsTRICT COURTS (1966), reprintedin 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966) [hereinafter cited by F.R.D. page number
as Advisory Comm. Note].
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
3. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974).
4. See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
5. 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
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(c)(2) class action scheme with radically different procedures,6 but the
proposed notice provisions fail to deal with some of the cost problems
posed by current interpretations of subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(2).7 After a brief summary of the background of the notice cost problem, this
Note will analyze the impact of Oppenheimer on the various approaches for dealing with (c)(2) notice costs and will address the shortcomings of the Department of Justice's proposed notice provisions.
I.

THE NOTICE COST PROBLEM: BACKGROUND

When the present version of Rule 23 was adopted in 1966, the Advisory Committee noted that subdivision (b)(3) was intended to encompass "those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated .... "8 This concern with economy and uni-

formity, however, was to be achieved "without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." 9 More importantly, unlike the old rule, subdivision (b)(3) was to provide a vehicle
for litigating the claims of members of a class of similarly situated persons, and for binding the members of the class in a single lawsuit, even
though different questions affected individual members.' 0 At the same
time, however, the drafters of the rule recognized that even where subdivision (b)(3) provides a suitable method for redressing the injuries of
an entire class, individual members might wish to pursue their own
claims. 1 Subdivision (c)(2) therefore provides that a class member has
the right to be excluded from the class on his request. 2 To protect this
right to be excluded, subdivision (c)(2) provides that in (b)(3) actions,
"the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all mem13
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort."'
The subdivision (c)(2) notice requirements soon generated substantial controversy, particularly with regard to the form of notice and
the question of who was to bear the cost of sending the notice to the
6. See OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE PROCEDURAL REMEDIES FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT CAUSING MASS Eco-

INJURIES (1977) (draft statute with comment); cf.S. 3475 (modified version of OIAJ proposal). See text accompanying notes 158-78 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 179-83 infra.
8. Advisory CommL Note 102-03.
9. Id 103.
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Advisory ComrL Note 103.
11. Advisory Comm. Note 104-05.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
13. 1d
NOMIC
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members of the class.' 4 The Supreme Court confronted this controt Eisen, whose individual stake
versy in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin."
in the damages was only $70, 16 sought to represent a class with six million members. 17 The names and addresses of over two million members could be obtained from the defendants' records. 8 Eisen argued

unsuccessfully that notice by publication would satisfy the requirements of subdivision (c)(2) and that, in any event, the defendant should
bear the cost of notice. The Court concluded that in (b)(3) class actions, "individual notice must be provided to those class members who
are identifiable through reasonable effort,"' 9 even though the cost of
such notice to the two million identifiable members would be in excess

of $300,000.20 "The usual rule [said the Court] is that a plaintiff must
initially bear the cost of notice to the class.'
The impact of the Eisen decision is difficult to measure. Some

courts and commentators have suggested that the decision has had little
impact at all, and that (b)(3) claims are as numerous now as before the

decision.2 2 These observers argue that the costs of notice are not so
14. See, e.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (court divided notice cost equally between plaintiff and defendant); Battle v. Municipal Hous. Auth., 53
F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court imposed notice cost on defendant); Cohen v. Franchard Corp.,
51 F.R.D. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (court imposed notice cost on plaintiff), aj'donother grounds, 478
F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973); Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (court sent out
notice at its own expense and on court stationery).
15. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Several of the opinions in the Eisen litigation are relevant to the
discussion herein. The reported history of Eisen is as follows: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41
F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.), appealallowed,370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) (Eisen ]), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 (1967), rev'd andremanded while retainingjurisdiion, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (EisenI1),
on remand, 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 54 F.R.D. 565
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd,479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen 111), vacated and remanded,417 U.S.
156 (1974) (Eisen IVor Eisen). Subsequent citations to one or more of the Eien opinions appear
without the accompanying case history.
16. 417 U.S. at 161.
17. Id at 166.
18. Id
19. Id at 175.
20. Id at 167 n.7.
21. Id at 178. The Court specifically rejected the use of a preliminary "mini-hearing" into
the merits to determine who should bear the cost of (c)(2) notice, reasoning that such a procedure
was not authorized by Rule 23. Id at 177-78. The rationales of the Supreme Court and of the
circuit court decision that it affirmed, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), have been widely criticized.
See, e.g., 2 H. NEWBERO, CLASS AcTIONS § 2300a (1977); Dam, ClassAction Notice: Who Needs
It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 97; Note, Managingthe Large ClassAction: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 433, 440 (1973); Note, The ManageabilityCrisisof Consumer ClassActions:
The Severe Example of Eisen 111, 7 IND. L. REV. 361, 389 (1973); 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
254, 265-66 (1975); 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1654 (1973); V.c Note, Class Actions Under Federal
Rule 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. REV. 139 (1969) (pre-Eisendiscussion of notice
requirement).
22. See, e.g., Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 646, 655 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Mulligan,
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high that plaintiffs have been discouraged from utilizing the procedural
benefits of subdivision (b)(3). 2 3 On the other hand, it is impossible to

determine how many plaintiffs might have brought (b)(3) actions but
for the cost of notice to the class. Where a plaintiff represents a large
class of injured persons who have in the aggregate suffered substantial
damages, but whose individual claims are too small to support individ-

ual causes of action, that plaintiffs reluctance to pay for notice, the cost
of which might amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars, would be
understandable. Thus, by placing on (b)(3) plaintiffs the cost of the
initial notice required by subdivision (c)(2), the Eisen decision has, as a

practical matter, limited the availability of a class action for pursuing
federal claims in precisely the situation in which the damaged persons
are least likely to pursue their claims individually.24
The Eisen decision, then, raises the question of how potential
(b)(3) plaintiffs can minimize or avoid the burden of notice costs. Several important possibilities exist, each of which will be addressed be-

low. 25 First, some plaintiffs have sought to distinguish the costs of
C.J., dissenting), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340
(1978); 5 CLASS AcT.REP. 133, 237 (1978).
23. See sources cited at note 22 supra.
24. See 124 CONG. REC. S14,501, S14,502 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (bill commentary to S.
3475); 124 CONG. REC. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum); Lyons, Class
Actions, 1974/75 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 349, 356; 16 B.C. INDUS., supra note 21, at 264; cf.Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (requiring each class member to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement). For similar conclusions in response to the decisions in Eisen 1H and
Eisen III, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1022-25 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen III)
(Oakes, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Pomerantz, New Developments in Class
Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1263 (1970) (commenting on
Eisen 11).
25. Several suggestions for dealing with the notice cost problem have been made that, because of various shortcomings, have had little impact on class action litigation. One such suggestion was the organization of a Public Equity Corporation (PEC), which had as its business
purpose the financing of class action litigation for a profit. See 4 CLASS AC. REP. 308 (1975).
The PEC concept was apparently abandoned after the initial stock offering failed for lack of investor interest. Id 341. Another suggestion was that charitable foundations or consumer groups
could donate notice costs, to be reimbursed from any recovery received by the plaintiffs. See
Cohen, Reflections on Supreme Court Arguments-Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
25, 1974, at I, col. I. At least one organization exists that provides financial assistance in class
action suits, but plaintiffs are generally limited to assistance under $5,000. See 5 CLASS. AcT.
REP. 305 (1978); c Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) ClassAction: An EmpiricalStudy, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123,
1160 (1974) (study results indicate that, on a national basis, 35% of (b)(3) class actions involve
notice costs in excess of $5,000).
Some commentators have suggested that subdivisions (b)(l) and (b)(2) of Rule 23 might be
used as alternatives to (b)(3), see e.g., 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note 21, at § 2425d, at 106-08, since
notice is discretionary for actions qualifying under those subdivisions. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(d)(2). While (b)(l) actions can involve claims for monetary relief, see, e.g., Zachary v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the focus in such actions is on the legality of the
ongoing or imminent conduct of the party opposing the class. Actions under subdivision (b)(3)
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identifying class members from costs of printing and mailing the notice, with the former treated as a discovery cost that can be imposed
upon the defendant.26 Second, notwithstanding the usual rule with regard to the cost of (c)(2) notice, Justice Powell, in his opinion for the
Eisen majority, left open the possibility that a preexisting fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant might support imposing notice costs on the defendant.27 Third, the plaintiff's counsel
might advance the cost of (c)(2) notice and aid in the solicitation of
funds from absentee class members. 28 Finally, Justice Douglas suggested in Eisen that the (c)(2) notice cost burden might be lessened
under subdivision (c)(4)-which provides for the division of a class into
subclasses 2 9-by treating one subclass as a test case.3° Similarly, the
Third Circuit decided shortly before Eisen that a plaintiff's individual
3
claim might be tested in a test case before certification of the class. 1 If
the plaintiff's claim failed, no notice to the class would be necessary; if
it were successful, the cost of notice could be imposed on the defendant. 2
II.

OPPENHEMER AND COSTS OF IDENTIFYING CLASS MEMBERS

After Eisen established that ordinarily the plaintiff initially must
bear the cost of (c)(2) notice, the question of what was meant by notice
focus on the redress of individual class members for conduct already concluded. See Bennett,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Supreme Court CallsforRevamping of Class Action Strategy, 1974
Wis. L. REv. 801, 817-18. Even if a damage action is permitted under subdivision (b)(1), the court

is likely to require notice to absentee members of the class. See, e.g., Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bennett, supra at 817-18; c 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1793 (1972 & Supp. 1978) (giving some type of

notice in (b)(l) actions is the best practice in most cases). Subdivision (b)(2) of Rule 23 applies to
class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief, not actions for money damages. Notice may still
be required, however. See, e.g., Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1977), Eley v. Morris,
390 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ga. 1975); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supraat § 1793. Where an action
involves both (b)(2) and (b)(3) aspects and the court determines that no notice is necessary as to
the (b)(2) portion of the case, the court might subdivide the action to minimize (c)(2) notice costs.
See, e.g., Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ga. 1974), motionfor rehearing
denied, 68 F.R.D. 204 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
26. See text accompanying notes 33-38 infra.
27. 417 U.S. at 178 & n.15. See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 90-96 infra.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) provides:

When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
30. 417 U.S. at 179-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). See text accompanying notes 124-36 infra.
31. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
32. 496 F.2d at 761. See text accompanying notes 138-42 infra.
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became a special concern for the plaintiff seeking to minimize the notice cost burden. Where the names and addresses of the absentee members were contained in the records of the defendant or a nonparty to
the class action, the question was whether the costs of identifying the
absentees was a cost of notice, and thus a cost to be borne by the plaintiff. The Oppenheimer decision has made it clear that in (b)(3) class
actions, identification of class members is part and parcel of (c)(2) notice.
A.

Identfcationfrom the Defendant's Records.

Oppenheimer addressed a conflict between two circuits over the
treatment of identification costs where the information was contained
in the records of a party or of someone controlled by a party opposing
the class action.33 The central issue dividing the two circuits was the
33. See Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 646 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (records kept by defendant's transfer agent that, although not a party to the action, was controlled by a party), rev'dand
remandedsubnom. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978); In re Nissan Motor
Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977) (records kept by the defendant). For
discussions of the circuit court decisions in Sanders and Nissan, see Note, Allocation of Idenification Costs in ClassActions. Sanders v. Levy, 91 HARV. L. REv. 703 (1978); 66 CAL. L. REV. 105
(1978).
Before Nissan and the lower courts' decisions in Oppenheimer,the question of whether (c)(2)
notice included identification of class members did not receive much attention by courts or litigants. Before Eisen, several trial courts implicitly distinguished costs of identification from costs
of printing and mailing notice, imposing the former costs on defendants and the latter on plaintiffs; in each case, the identification was made from records in the possession of the corporate
defendant. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 62 F.R.D. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Lamb v.
United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1969); c. Herbst v.
I T & T Corp., 65 F.R.D. 13, 19-20 (D. Conn. 1973) (where names and addresses of absentee class
members were contained in defendants' computer tapes, defendants were ordered to provide
plaintiff with "the requisite materials in their possession" to "facilitate and expedite the plaintiff's
task" of notice), ar'd,495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (defendant ordered to "supply such material in its possession to plaintiffs' attorneys as will
help enable them to locate" the absentee members of the class for purposes of (c)(2) notice), modified on othergrounds, 49 F.R.D. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Berland,however, plaintiff and defendants alike wanted the underlying suits declared class actions. 48 F.R.D. at 132-33. In Appelton
Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974), an action to compel
refunds of illegal rate increase, the common carrier defendants in bad faith failed to keep adequate records to facilitate identification of class members. Id at 135. Several additional decisions
did not place the burden of identification clearly on either plaintiff or defendant; the identification
process did not appear to be difficult and the issue of costs vis-a-vis notice was not raised. See,
e.g., B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 140, 145 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Cohen v. Franchard
Corp., 51 F.R.D. 167, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'don other grounds, 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kom v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74 n.8
(D. Utah 1966). The one case in which a court squarely held that the plaintiffs must bear costs of
identification was an antitrust civil damages action brought by several states as parens patriae. In
re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.), a 'dper curiam sub nom. Pfizer, Inc.
v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971).
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applicability of the discovery rules34 to identification of absentee class
members." In both cases, the plaintiffs urged that the discovery rules
provided the proper standards for identifying the absentee members
from the defendants' records. 36 Under the discovery rules, the defendants normally would have to bear the cost of compiling from their
records a list of the names and addresses of class members.37 Rule
26(c) would authorize the court to protect the responding defendants
from undue burden or expense.38
The Oppenheimer Court held that Rule 23(c), not the discovery
rules, governs the identification issue; subdivision (d) of the rule pro39
vides the trial court with discretion in dealing with identification.
The Court reasoned that "[t]he critical point is that the information is
sought to facilitate the sending of notice rather than to define or clarify
Following Eisen, but before Nissan and Oppenheimer, the identification question continued
to receive sketchy treatment. Some courts imposed identification costs on the corporations whose
records contained the information, but did not analyze the scope of the term "notice" in subdivision (c)(2). See, e.g., City of New York v. Darling-Delaware, Inc., [1976-1] Trade Cas. 60,812
(S.D.N.Y.); Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1322 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Foster v.
Maryland State Say. & Loan Ass'n, [1974-2] Trade Cas. 1 75,277 (D.D.C.). Other courts placed
the identification burden on plaintiffs, still without an analysis of "notice." See, e.g., In re Sugar
Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re United States Financial Sec.
Litigation, 69 F.R.D. 24 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
This erratic line of precedent for the identification costs problem suggests that in many cases
such costs are not substantial enough to warrant litigating the question of who should pay.
Clearly, however, identification costs are substantial in some cases. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. at 345 ($16,000 cost of identification); Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72
F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ($14,500 cost of identification). It should be noted that in Oppenheimer the names and addresses of the class members were contained in computerized records of
a defendant's transfer agent; the $16,000 cost of designing a program to obtain the names and
addresses from those records was the focal point of the dispute. 437 U.S. at 345. In Nissan,
identification of the absent class members required examination of 1.7 million cards of the defendant. 552 F.2d at 1094. For the would-be (b)(3) plaintiff seeking to represent a large class of
persons whose aggregate damages are substantial, but whose individual claims are small, the cost
of identifying absentee members, when added to the cost of printing and mailing the notice, might
place the cost of the suit beyond that plaintiffs financial resources. See Chevalier v. Baird Say.
Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. at 148; Bernstein, Issues Becoming More Sophisticatedas Class Action Litigation
Continues, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 50, col. 4.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
35. See Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 648 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) ("the information sought
by plaintiffs as to the names and addresses of the members of the class is indeed within the broad
scope of permissible discovery established by our Federal Rules"), rev'd andremanded sub nom.
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust
Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088, 1102 (5th Cir. 1977) (discovery rules do not "provide a proper model for
analyzing this problem").
36. 437 U.S. at 350; 552 F.2d at 1100.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
39. 437 U.S. at 342, 350.

Vol. 1979:8821

NOTICE COST PROBLEMS

issues in the case."4 The Court rejected the contention of the corporate defendants "that Eisen IV always requires a representative plaintiff to pay all costs incident to sending notice, whether he or the
defendant performs the required tasks."4 1 Still, the Court reasoned
that
a district court exercising its discretion under Rule 23(d) should be
considerably more ready to place the cost of the defendant's performing an ordered task on the representative plaintiff, who derives
the benefit, than under Rule 26(c). In the usual case, the test should
rather than, as under Rule
be whether the expense is substantial,
42
26(c), whether it is "undue.",
In language resembling that of Eisen, the Court stated that "[t]he
general rule must be that the representative plaintiff should perform the
tasks" 43 relating to class notice, including identification of class members and that "ordinarily there is no warrant for shifting the cost. . . of
these tasks to the defendant."' The Court left open the possibility that
where the defendant could "perform a necessary task with less difficulty or expense than could the representative plaintiff, ' 45 a district
court might properly order the defendant to perform the task; in doing
so, the Court acknowledged that a limited analogy could be drawn
from practice under the discovery rules.46 In the Court's view, however, such an "analogy necessarily is imperfect. . . because in the Rule
23(d) context, the defendant's own case rarely will be advanced by his
having performed the tasks."47 Noting that the cost of identification
would be the same for either party, the Court imposed the cost on the
40. Id at 350.
If respondents had sought the information because of its relevance to the issues, they
would not have been willing, as they were, to abandon their request if the District Court
would accept their proposed redefinition of the class and method of sending notice. Re-

spondents argued to the District Court that they desired this information to enable them
to send the class notice, and not for any other purpose.
Id at 353. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). By contrast, the en banc majority of the circuit court
concluded that "[t]he holding of Eisen IV itself propels us ineluctably to the conclusion that the
names and addresses of class members are 'relevant to the subject matter' of a class action." 558
F.2d at 648.
41. 437 U.S. at 356. In Nissan, the corporate defendants argued that (b)(3) plaintiffs, as
fiduciary representatives of the absent class members, must always pay notification costs. 552
F.2d at 1102. While the Nissan court expressly reserved any ruling on the merits of this fiduciary
approach, see id, the Supreme Court's language in Oppenheimerclearly rejects the Nissan defendants' characterization of plaintiffs' obligation with respect to identifying absent class members.
437 U.S. at 356-57.
42. 437 U.S. at 358-59.
43. Id at 356.
44. Id

45. Id
46. Id at 356-57.
47. Id at 358.
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representative plaintiff.48
The Oppenheimer Court's resolution of the identification cost issue
poses several problems. First, it will not always be clear whether identification of absent class members is strictly a part of the (c)(2) notice
process or relates to the subject matter of the pending litigation.4 9 Because the identification process is one of gathering information, it bears
a strong resemblance to discovery. Indeed, the Oppenheimer Court
conceded that the names and addresses of absent class members might,
in some cases, be obtained under the discovery rules." The absentees,
for example, might possess information that would assist the representative plaintiffs in their conduct of the litigation." But the Court's admonition that "it may be doubted whether any of these purposes would
require compilation of the names and addresses of all members of a
large class," 52 suggests that it will be a rare case in which a (b)(3) plaintiff will be able to obtain through discovery the names and addresses of
class members.
A second problem is raised by the suggestion in Oppenheimer that
district courts have some discretion to allocate the tasks and the cost of
identification between plaintiff and defendant. 3 Eisen foreclosed the
use of any preliminary inquiry into the merits of an action as a means
of allocating notice costs between plaintiff and defendant. 4 If burdening a defendant with the performance or expense of identification is
contingent upon a determination that the defendant's case will be advanced,55 district courts might well refuse
to make such a determina56
tion to avoid running afoul of Eisen.
The most important consequence of the Oppenheimer decision is
that it will add to the cost burden of would-be class representatives in
(b)(3) actions where the names and addresses of the class members are
contained in the records of a party opposing the class. After Oppenheimer, defendants in (b)(3) actions certainly will succeed in imposing
48. Id at 360.

49. Indeed, in Oppenheimeritself, the en bane majority of the circuit court concluded that the
names and addresses of the absent class members were relevant to the subject matter of (b)(3)
class actions. 558 F.2d at 648.
50. 437 U.S. at 354 n.20.
51. Id
52. Id
53. Id at 342, 350, 359. See text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
54. 417 U.S. 177-78.
55. See 437 U.S. at 358.
56. Cf.Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the
court read Eisen's rejection of a preliminary inquiry to preclude any allocation of notice costs
between plaintiff and defendant, notwithstanding a suggestion in Eisen that such allocation might
be appropriate in some circumstances).
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identification costs on plaintiffs, even if the task is concomitant to discovery. Indeed, the Court's suggestion that "in some instances, the expense involved may be so insubstantial as not to warrant the effort
required to calculate it and shift it to the representative plaintiff,"5 7 indicates that where a (b)(3) plaintiff most needs relief from costs of identification, he will be least likely to obtain it, at least at the expense of
the defendant. 8
B.

Identficationfrom the Records of a Nonparty.

The Oppenheimer decision also affects the problem posed when the
information needed to identify absentee class members is in the records
of someone not a party and not controlled by a party to the class action
litigation.5 9 This problem has arisen where stock is held in street name
by a broker for the beneficial owners, who are members of the plaintiff
class.6" The courts that have addressed the question have concluded
that the proper method for obtaining the names and addresses of the
beneficial owners is by subpoenas duces tecum: the court issuing the
subpoena would have power under Rule 26(c) to deal with questions
about the expense of providing the requested information.6 Under
this approach, the cost to the nonparty broker is treated as a normal
business, expense where the cost to the broker is modest and the total
cost of identification would be burdensome to the plaintiff if he had to
pay the costs of all the brokers who were requested to produce the
names and addresses of the defendant's shareholders.6 2
After the Oppenheimer decision, however, there can be little doubt
that the plaintiff should normally bear the costs of identifying absentee
class members whose shares are held in street name. Oppenheimer
makes it clear that identification of class members is part of a (b)(3)
plaintiff's obligations under subdivision (c)(2).63 If defendants would
57. 437 U.S. at 359.
58. Presumably, where a defendant has in bad faith made it more difficult for the plaintiff to
obtain the names and addresses of absentee members, the defendant could be made to bear even
substantial costs. See Appelton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 135-37
(7th Cir. 1974).
59. In Oppenheimer, the records containing the names and addresses of the absentee class
members were kept by the defendant fund's transfer agent, which was not a party to the action.
See 437 U.S. at 359. The fund, however, controlled the records. Id
60. See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litigation, 574 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1978), modoed, 599
F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1979); Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 54 F.R.D. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Bernstein,
supra note 33, at 51.
61. See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litigation, 574 F.2d at 669, 675-76; Blank v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 54 F.R.D. at 627.
62. 574 F.2d at 669, 675-76.
63. See 437 U.S. at 349. Arguably, the cost of notifying members of a class whose shares are
held in a street name should be borne by the beneficial owners and their brokers, since it is their
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obtain little benefit from identifying at their own expense absentee class
members,6 4 a nonparty broker would benefit even less. Where a non-

party broker, then, performs the identification task, there is little basis
for departing from the ordinary rule articulated in Oppenheimer that
the plaintiff must bear the cost of identification.
III.

OPPENHEIMER AND THE FIDUCIARY DUTY "ExcEPTION"

The Eisen Court expressly avoided determining whether a corporate defendant might have to bear the cost of notice "where a fiduciary

duty pre-existed between the plaintiff and defendant, as in a shareholder derivative suit,' 65 or, put another way, where the relationship
between the parties is not "truly adversary." 66 The principle justifica-

tions for such an approach are that a corporation regularly communicates with its shareholders, so that an additional enclosure in a regular
mailing would not be burdensome, and, more importantly, that the
plaintiff shareholders will ultimately bear the expense to the corporation.67 After Oppenheimer, whatever exception to the normal notice

cost rule previously existed based on a fiduciary relationship is a virtual
dead letter.
The plaintiffs in Oppenheimer were shareholders in an open-ended

investment company, Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. The fund's portfolio
was managed by Oppenheimer & Co., a brokerage firm. The plaintiffs
alleged violations of federal securities laws for failure to disclose mateconvenience that is served by the arrangement. See Bernstein, supra note 33, at 51. The Oppenheimer Court emphasized, however, that "courts must not stray too far from the principle underlying Eisen IV that the representative plaintiff should bear all costs relating to the sending of
notice because it is he who seeks to maintain the suit as a class action." 437 U.S. at 359. Moreover, Rule 23 provides no mechanism for such cost allocation. See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec.
Litigation, 574 F.2d 662, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1978), modfied, 599 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1979); FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c).
64. See 437 U.S. at 357.
65. 417 U.S. at 178.
66. Id at 178-79. As an example of a case in which a court had imposed the cost of notice on
a defendant on the basis of a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff class, the Eiren Court cited Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd and remandedon othergrounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d
Cir. 197 1). See 417 U.S. at 178 n.15. The Dolgow court also justified imposing the cost of (c)(2)
notice on the defendant on the bases of the defendant's putative interest in binding the plaintiff
class under principles of res judicata and of the defendant's ability to bear the expense of notice.
43 F.R.D. at 472. After Eisen, however, these factors were no longer relevant to the notice cost
issue. See 417 U.S. at 177-79. Moreover, Eisen III expressly disapproved the Dolgow decision.
479 F.2d at 1012, 1019. Thus, even before Oppenheimer,Dolgow was of questionable precedential
value. After Oppenheimer, it is clearly of no precedential value. See text accompanying notes 7989 infra.
67. See Note, Federal Procedure-ClassActions Under 1966Amenments to Rule 23-Notice
andDamage Distribution-Eisenv. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F2d1005 (2d Cir.1973), 5 U. TOL.
L. REv. 180, 188-89 (1973); 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1653 n.70 (1973).
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rial information to investors. They brought class actions against the
manager, the brokerage company and its partners, and the officers and
directors of the fund and the manager.68 The fund was not named as a
defendant in the class action.69 The shareholders in the fund also
brought derivative actions on behalf of the fund, naming as defendants
the fund and the class action defendants.70 The class and derivative
actions were then consolidated.7 1
As an alternative to their identification costs argument, 72 the
shareholders argued that the defendants owed them a fiduciary duty in
the matter of purchases of stock in the fund and that, having breached
that duty, the defendants should bear the expense of notice.7 3 The trial
court imposed a portion of the notice cost on the defendants without
discussing the shareholders' fiduciary duty argument.74 On appeal, a
panel of the Second Circuit declined to impose the costs on the defendants because the fund was not a party to the class action claims and
because the court found no special circumstances, apart from a possible
fiduciary relationship, to warrant shifting to the other defendants any
of the cost of notice.7 5 The panel decision was reversed on rehearing en
banc without mention of the plaintiffs' fiduciary position with the defendants.7 6 In the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs' attempt to impose
some notice costs on the defendant was rejected:
A bare allegation of wrongdoing, whether by breach of fiduciary
duty or otherwise, is not a fair reason for requiring a defendant to
undertake financial burdens and risks to further a plaintiffs case.
Nor would it be in the interests of the class of persons to whom a
fiduciary duty is owed to require them, through the fiduciary, to help
finance every suit by one of their number that alleges a breach of
fiduciary duty, without regard to whether the suit has any merit.77
Oppenheimer illustrates the most difficult problems posed by the
Eisen suggestion that the cost of initial notice might properly be imposed on a corporate defendant in some situations. First, the Eisen
68. 437 U.S. at 340, 342-43.
69. See Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d at 640. But see Brief for Respondent at 53, Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
70. See Sanders v. Levy, 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1218, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
71. Id,
72. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
73. Brief for Respondent, supra note 69, at 54-55.
74. 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 1221.
75. 558 F.2d at 640-41. Judge Hays dissented in part from the panel decision, arguing that
the class action defendants owed the plaintiff shareholders a high level of fiduciary duty under the
federal securities laws and thus could be made to bear at least a portion of the cost of notice. Id
at 645-46.
76. Id at 652 n.2. Judge Hays wrote the en banc opinion overturning the panel.
77. 437 U.S. at 363.
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suggestion presupposes two essential relationships: a fiduciary relationship and a nonadversarial relationship. More importantly, however,
those relationships must exist between parties to the class action. In the
Oppenheimer class action, the relationship between the fund and the
shareholder class was fiduciary and nonadversarial, but the relationship was not between parties. While the class defendants were parties
and owed plaintiffs fiduciary duties, the plaintiffs' claim for damages
against the defendants created an adversarial relationship.78
Practically the only situation in which a defendant is nonadversarial and owes a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff is a derivative action. A
derivative action, however, is governed by Rule 23.1, 79 which does not
require that initial notice be sent to shareholders.8 0 The plaintiffs in
Oppenheimer argued that Eisen could not have intended to limit the
fiduciary relationship language to derivative actions for this very reason.8 ' They also sought to overcome the problem that the fund was not
named in the complaint as a defendant by pointing to the named defendants' asserted cross-claims and setoffs against the fund. 2 Presumably, in this posture the fund could be regarded as a party to the class
action claim and yet have interests aligned with and not truly adversarial to those of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court did not mention
this argument in its decision. 3 Certainly the assertion by a defendant
of a right of setoff or indemnification against a nonparty can alter the
procedural posture of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the third person. 4 But to
the extent that the third person is liable for the claim made against the
defendant, its interests are clearly adverse to those of the plaintiff.85
Even if a defendant owes the plaintiff class a fiduciary duty and is
nonadversarial, a second problem remains in distinguishing between
78. See Madonick v. Denison Mines Ltd., 63 F.R.D. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Madonick, a
corporation was named as a defendant in a class action brought by one of its minority shareholders. The court reasoned that because neither the plaintiffnor the members of the class he sought
to represent had a substantial equity interest in the corporation, their interest in obtaining money

damages outweighed any concern they might have about the adverse impact a damages award
would have on the corporation. The court therefore rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the relation of the parties was not "truly adversarial" and that Esen did not require that plaintiff bear the

costs of (c)(2) notice. Id at 659-60.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
80. 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE %1.401 (2d ed. 1969); Kaplan, Continuing Work ofthe
Civil Committee, 1966 Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure(I), 81 HARV. L. REV.

356, 387 n.118 (1967).
81. Brief for Respondent, supra note 69, at 55.

82. Id at 57-58. See 437 U.S. at 344 n.4.
83. See 437 U.S. at 363-64.
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (impleader).
85. Rule 14(a) provides that "[tlhe third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any
defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim."
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meritorious and unmeritorious claims that the fiduciary duty was
breached. 6 The Eisen Court concluded that Rule 23 did not ordinarily

authorize a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a proposed class action as a means of allocating notice costs: such a "procedure is directly
contrary to the command of subdivision (c)(1) that the court determine
whether a suit denominated a class action may be maintained as such

'[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of [the] action." 8 '

Although the Court left open the allocation question in cases involving

fiduciary duties and nonadversarial relationships, 8 Rule 23 affords no
guidance whatsoever for allocating notice costs. Any attempt to evaluate by preliminary inquiry the merits of a proposed class action raises

the same problems under the notice provisions of Rule 23, regardless of
the basis for the suit.8 9

IV.

ADVANCEMENT AND SOLICITATION BY COUNSEL OF NOTICE

COSTS
The potentially high cost to (b)(3) plaintiffs of (c)(2) notice has
focused attention on the fee arrangements between would-be class representatives and their attorneys and on the financial resources of (b)(3)
plaintiffs. Some commentators have suggested, and some plaintiffs
have agreed, that attorneys of class representatives can assist in easing
the plaintiffs' notice costs burden by advancing the costs of the litigation and by soliciting funds from absent class members.90 Under the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney can advance the
plaintiff, or solicit from class members, the costs of the class action, but
the attorney cannot assume those costs. 9 1
86. See 437 U.S. at 363.
87. 417 U.S. at 178.
88. Id at 178 n.15.
89. In Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 125, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
the court reasoned that
[a]s a result [of Eisen] any principle on the basis of which costs could be allocated would,
of necessity, be an essentially inflexible one. Thus, if it were to be decided that in suits
where the defendants owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, defendants should bear the
cost of notice, this principle would have to be applied to all suits where such a preexisting fiduciary duty existed regardless of the size of the class or the strength or weakness of the case.
90. See, e.g., Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa.
1974), amended,69 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cohen, supra note 25, at 1.
91. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that an attorney may advance the costs
of litigation only if the client remains liable ultimately for the expenses. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 5-103(B). Notice costs under Rule 23(c)(2) fall within the meaning
of costs under D.R. 5-103(B). See Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 931
n.7 (7th Cir. 1972); P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973). If a client
seeking to represent a class of plaintiffs does not agree to assume ultimate liability for the extra
costs of the class litigation, the suit must be brought as an individual one or the lawyer must
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Defendants against class actions, however, frequently attempt to
obtain discovery into the class representatives' finances and fee arrangements with counsel, arguing that advancement or solicitation of
costs raises questions about the adequacy of the plaintiffs representation of the class. 92 It is asserted that in order to represent the class
fairly and adequately the representatives must be financially able to
bear the notice and other costs of litigation. 93 Where the class representatives are unable or unwilling to bear these costs, their attorneys,
by proceeding with the action, would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.94 If the representatives' counsel are guilty of ethics violations, the argument goes, then the representatives cannot
adequately represent the class and class action status should be denied. 95 Named plaintiffs counter that their ability to finance the costs
of litigation is no more relevant in class actions than in normal lawsuits.

96

To the extent that Oppenheimer limits the use of other devices for
easing the cost burden of (c)(2) notice, attempts to utilize the advantages of solicitation and advancement will become more common.
Two questions, then, are posed by efforts to obtain discovery into the
personal finances and attorneys' fee arrangements of (b)(3) plaintiffs:
whether the discovery rules or the provisions of Rule 23 provide the
proper model for inquiry into the plaintiff's finances and fee arrangements; and what is the proper scope of such inquiries. As will be
shown, 97 the discovery rules provide the proper model, and a limited
inquiry into the plaintiff's finances can protect the interests of the class
and of the parties to the action.
withdraw. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1283 (1973). Moreover, where
the client does not agree to assume the costs, the attorney may not attempt to obtain settlement by
threatening a class action. Id See also id No. 1361 (1976).
A lawyer may not recommend or request another lawyer to recommend his employment as a
private practitioner to a nonlawyer who has not sought his advice regarding the employment of a
lawyer. D.R. 2-103. If the success of a client in class action litigation is dependent on joinder of
others, "a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose
of obtaining theirjoinder." D.R. 2-104(A)(5). It is ethically proper for an attorney to solicit funds
from class members to be used to help defray expenses of mailing notice to all class members.
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1326 (1975).

92. See, e.g., Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
One prerequisite to maintaining any class action is that "the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
93. See, e.g., Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 409 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Wis. 1976), rel'd on other
grounds, 578 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1977).
94. Id See note 91 supra.
95. See, eg., Elster v. Alexander, 74 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
96. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914
(1975).
97. See notes 98, 114-15 infra and text accompanying notes 98-120 infra.
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The ProperModelfor Inquiry.

The Oppenheimer decision, while limited on its facts to the relationship of the discovery rules to the notice requirement of Rule
23(c)(2), nonetheless provides some insights into the relationship between the discovery rules and issues arising under the broader requirements of Rule 23.98 The Court noted that Rule 23 "deals
comprehensively with class actions," 99 and that subdivision (d) of the

rule gives the trial court broad discretion in conducting the litigation.l°°
Just as a district court must routinely answer questions relating to the
form and manner of sending class notice in (b)(3) actions, one argument upon which the Oppenheimer Court based its decision, l10 so must
the district court address the question of the adequacy of representation
in purported class actions. Carrying this analysis one step further, a
district court could handle questions concerning the adequacy of representation, including the plaintiff's finances and his fee arrangements
with counsel, under Rule 23(d), drawing on the discovery rules by anal-

ogy for guidance.
On the other hand, the Oppenheimer Court distinguished information relating simply to the sending of notice and information that "may
bear on some issue which the District Court must decide." 10 2 Clearly,
the ability of the plaintiff to represent fairly and adequately the interests of the class is an issue for the court to decide in every proposed
class action.10 3 Moreover, adequacy of representation is only one of
the prerequisites to a class action,'" and courts generally allow discov98. At least one district court has concluded that the defendant's questions regarding the
financial arrangements between the would-be class representative and his counsel and the plaintiff's ability to satisfy a judgment for costs were outside the scope of the discovery rules because
the information sought was not relevant to the subject matter of the action. See Bogosian v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Apparently, however, the defendants in Bogosian made no argument that the plaintiff's finances and fee arrangements related to his ability to
represent the class fairly and adequately. Id Other district courts, however, have reached the
opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379
(E.D. Pa. 1974), amended, 69 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 60 F.R.D 634 (W.D. Pa. 1973); f Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975) (court assumed, without discussion, that the discovery rules provided the proper model for inquiring into the finances and fee arrangements of class action plaintiffs).
99. 437 U.S. at 354.
100. Id
101. Id at 355 n.23.
102. Id at 353 n.18. The problem in Oppenheimer was that, in the Court's view, the issue of
whether the required notice had properly been sent would not arise until the absentee class members had been identified and notice had been sent. Id at 354 & n.19.
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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ery regarding the appropriateness of a class action.10 5 While a plaintiff's ability to finance litigation is not an issue in an ordinary
lawsuit,' 6 neither is adequacy of representation. Certainly the issue of
finances and fee arrangements is of some relevance in determining the
plaintiff's ability to represent the class adequately, particularly where
large notice costs may be involved."0 7 Representative plaintiffs' concerns about intrusive discovery into finances and fee arrangements can
be accommodated by a careful delineation of the scope of inquiry.
B.

The Scope of the Inquiry.

The view that arrangements for advances and solicitation of litigation expenses are vehicles for widespread abuse of (b)(3) has some jusBut for the class action plaintiff of modest means faced
tification.'
with substantial notice and other costs, the value of counsel's advancement or solicitation from absent class members of funds to defray litigation expenses is clear: without such arrangements, those litigants
could not pursue their claims.' 09 Wide-ranging discovery into the personal finances and agreements with counsel of plaintiffs who have
made arrangements for advances or solicitation might discourage the
litigation of meritorious claims."t Rule 69(a),"'I which authorizes discovery into the assets of a judgment debtor, suggests that a litigant's
assets are not a proper subject of discovery prior to judgment."t 2 Moreover, alleged ethical problems in class actions are normally the subject
of inquiry in a separate proceeding from that of the class action certification hearing; misconduct on the part of an attorney should not
prejudice the rights of the client.' 1 3
105. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, at § 1785, at 131 & n.57 (Supp. 1978),
and cases cited therein.
106. See Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914
(1975); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
107. See Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d at 480.
108. See Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 76 F.R.D. 229 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Andrews, The
Class Action Bar lt's All Cat and Mouse, 4 JURis DOCTOR 18, 19 (1974).
109. See Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
alnended,69 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 5-8.
110. See Bernstein, supra note 33, at 50.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a) reads in pertinent part:
In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or his successor in interest
when that interest appears of record, may obtain discovery from any person, including
the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules or in the manner provided by
the practice of the state in which the district court is held.
112. Id See Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Il. 1972); Gangemi v. Moor, 268 F. Supp. 19 (D. Del. 1967). But cf Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61
F.R.D. 427, 434 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (financial resources of plaintiff are relevant to question of adequacy of representation).
113. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, at § 1766, at 166 & n.81.1 (Supp. 1978)
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To accommodate the need of class representatives for financial

assistance and, at the same time, to limit the potential for abuse of the
(b)(3) class action through unethical conduct by counsel, the party opposing class action certification could be limited initially to an inquiry
into the plaintiff's understanding of his obligation to pay notice and
other costs, and of his arrangements with counsel vis-a-vis those costs.
If the plaintiff understood the obligation and arrangements, no addi-

tional inquiry into his finances and arrangements with counsel would
be permitted unless judgment were rendered against him." 4 Several
courts, however, have disregarded the benefits of advances and solicita-

tion of litigation expenses, emphasizing instead the potential for abuse,
and have permitted wide-ranging discovery into the financial status of
the plaintiff." '5

Another argument that has been advanced to support discovery of
the plaintiffs finances is that under some federal statutes" 16 a defendant
who prevails on the merits might be entitled to recover as costs attor-

neys' fees from the plaintiff; it is asserted that this protection would be
meaningless if the finances of the representative plaintiff cannot be ascertained at the outset of the litigation.' 7 Courts, however, will usually
award a prevailing defendant attorneys' fees only where the plaintiff
'

brought a frivolous or bad faith claim."' As a practical matter, this
determination can be made only after a resolution of the case on the

merits. If the merits are resolved before class certification, as where the
defendant prevails against the plaintiff on summary judgment, then the
(discipline attorney, send remedial notice to class, but do not dismiss action), and cases cited
therein.
114. See Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 385-86 (E.D. Pa.
1974), amended, 69 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975); cf. Lim v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F.
Supp. 802, 812-13 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (refusal by plaintiff to answer defendant's questions about fee
arrangements with counsel could be grounds for denial of class certification); see also Sanderson
v. Winner, 587 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
115. See, e.g., Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 76 F.R.D. 229, 230 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (plaintiff's arrangement with her attorney for advancement of costs raised the possibility of abusing
Rule 23 by "the substitution of plaintiff's attorney for the representative plaintiff or the plaintiff
class as the real party in interest"); Elster v. Alexander, 74 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (court
ordered the plaintiff, whose individual stake was $800, to answer numerous interrogatories respecting his financial ability to maintain the action, his financial arrangements with counsel, his
personal litigating background, and his experience in purchasing and selling securities). See also
Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634, 637 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
116. E.g, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1731(e), 1988, 2000e-5(c) (1976).
117. See Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 76 F.R.D. 229, 231-32 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
118. See, e.g., Goffv. Texas Instruments, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 973, 975 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Hughes
v. Repko, 429 F. Supp. 928, 931 (W.D. Pa. 1977), rep'dinparton other grounds, 578 F.2d 483 (3d
Cir. 1978); Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84, 85 (D. Md. 1975); Paddison v. Fidelity
Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp.
519, 521-22 (E.D. La. 1971), aft'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
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question of whether the defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees can be
answered without reaching questions about adequate representation.
Apart from summary judgment situations, however, Eisen makes it
clear that courts cannot inquire into the merits of a suit in order to
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action."19 Because
the question of a plaintiff's liability for the defendant's attorneys' fees
is intertwined with the merits of the suit, it would be improper to consider a plaintiff's ability to pay such fees in determining that plaintiffs
ability to represent the class adequately. The proper time for discovery
of the plaintiff's assets would be after judgment has been awarded for
the defendant. 2 °
The better approach to prejudgment discovery of a plaintiffs assets and arrangements with counsel is to allow only a narrow inquiry to
insure that the plaintiff properly understands his responsibility for the
notice and other costs of the litigation. However, the possibility that
the court in which the action is filed will allow wide-ranging inquiry
suggests that the sometimes high cost of (c)(2) notice compounds questions about adequacy of representation in (b)(3) suits. If abuses of subdivision (b)(3) procedures do exist in the form of maintenance and
other unethical conduct by attorneys, that abuse might indicate that the
burden of (c)(2) notice is at times prohibitive for would-be class representatives.

V.

TEST CASE PROCEDURES

While Oppenheimer did not involve questions about the use of a
test case procedure to minimize notice costs, its holding that identification of absent class members is part of the plaintiff's notice obligation
and that preexisting fiduciary relationships will not support imposing
on defendants any of the cost of notice increases the relative significance of other means of minimizing notice costs. The test case procedures suggested by Justice Douglas in his Eisen opinion' 2 ' and by the
Third Circuit in Katz v. CarteBlanche Corp.,122 however, are of little, if
any, value to (b)(3) plaintiffs seeking to minimize or avoid the initial
cost of (c)(2) notice. Both procedures are legally unsound and at best
would provide plaintiffs with relief from notice in very limited circumstances.
119.
120.
121.
122.

417 U.S. at 177.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a). See notes 111-12 supra and accompanying text.
417 U.S. at 179-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,419 U.S. 885 (1974). For an analysis of the Carte

Blanche decision apart from its relevance to the notice cost problem, see 88 HARV. L. REV. 825
(1975).
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Justice Douglas' Test Case Procedures.

Although the Eisen majority dismissed the plaintiff's class action
as originally defined because of his unwillingness to pay the cost of
notice, Justice Powell emphasized that the dismissal was "without
prejudice to any efforts petitioner may make to redefine his class under
Rule 23(c)(4) . .. 123 Justice Douglas, in his separate opinion dissenting in part from the majority decision, argued that instead of dismissing the plaintiff's action, the district court could, under subdivision
(c)(4), define the subclasses "without amendment of the complaint as
filed."' 2 4 One subclass could then be treated as a test case, with the
other subclasses held in abeyance.12 This procedure would, in effect,
change a nonmanageable class into several manageable subclasses, in
an effort to lessen the cost to the plaintiff of the initial notice required
26
by subdivision (c)(2).1
The use of a subclass-test-case procedural device to lessen a (b)(3)
plaintiff's notice cost burden poses a number of problems. First, as Justice Douglas recognized, it is not clear what impact an adjudication of
the claims of one subclass would have on the claims of the members of
the larger class who are not parties. 2 7
If the subclass lost, it is argued that other investors not members of
that subclass could not be precluded from prosecuting successful
suits of their own, since they had never had their day in court or
necessarily even been apprised of the subclass' action .... If the
subclass won, strict application of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel would limit the usefulness of that subclass28 victory in suits brought
by investors not members of that subclass.'
"

Conceivably, then, the outcome of such a test case would bind
only the members of that subclass, subject to opting out, and the question of defendant's liability or wrongdoing would remain open as to the
remainder of the class, all because the first plaintiff who undertook to
represent the class was unwilling or unable to bear the cost of (c)(2)
notice to the entire class. Such a procedure would not serve the underlying policies of subdivision (b)(3) in achieving "economies of time,
effort and expense,"' l 2 9 nor would it promote uniformity of decisions as
123. 417 U.S. at 179 n.16. See note 29 supra.
124. 417 U.S. at 183.
125. Id at 179-80 (citing Eisen 111,479 F.2d 1005, 1023 (Oakes, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc)).
126. See 417 U.S. at 181.
127. Id at 181-82. Justice Douglas was also concerned that the statute of limitations might
run against members of the larger class that would not be members of the plaintiffs amended
subclass. Id at 181.
128. Id at 182 n.3.
129. Advisory Comm. Note 102.
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to persons similarly situated.13 0 In addition, neither the language of
subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) nor the history behind Rule 23 provides
any basis for a subclass test case procedure.' 3' In Eisen, the Supreme
Court rejected for this same reason the use of the preliminary
minihearing device, 132 indicating the necessity for at least a general ad-

herence to the mechanics of Rule 23, even at the risk of imposing a
substantial notice cost on a (b)(3) plaintiff.
Another question posed by the subclass test case procedure is
whether a plaintiffs unwillingness or inability to bear notice costs
amounts to nonmanageability. Put another way, the question arises
whether a court could divide a class into subclasses simply to ease the
burden of notice costs on the plaintiff. Justice Douglas looked at manageability in terms of the plaintiffs willingness or financial ability to
satisfy the notice requirements of (c)(2). 133 The majority in Eisen III,
however, regarded the case as unmanageable as a class action because
of the mechanical and administrative problems involved in notifying
the six million members of the class and in fashioning a procedure for
processing their individual claims in the event that the plaintiff prevailed.' 34 This suggests that manageability is a function of fairness to
the members of the class, not of a plaintiff's interest in minimizing the
cost of notice.135 Moreover, the Advisory Committee's Note on subdivision (c)(4)(B) speaks of "subclasses divergent in interest,"' 136 and not
subclasses created to deal with problems of manageability. Subdivision
(c)(4), then, does not support dividing a class into subclasses simply
because the plaintiff wants to lessen the cost of (c)(2) notice, especially
if the division is part of a test case procedure.
130. See id 102-03.
131. The Advisory Committee regarded the test case procedure as an alternative to a (b)(3)
class action. See id 103.
132. 417 U.S. at 177-78.

133. Id at 180 n.l.
134. 479 F.2d at 1016-17. The Supreme Court left this finding undisturbed. 417 U.S. at 169.
135. In Oppenheimer, the Court cited Justice Douglas' Eisen opinion to support the statement
that "it [is not] improper for the court to consider the potential impact that rulings on [the compo-

sition of a proper class and how notice should be sent]

. . .

may have on the expense that the

representative plaintiff must bear in order to send the notice." 437 U.S. at 360. This dictum,
however, was in the context of the Court's determination that the defendants could not be made to

bear any of the cost of notice simply because they opposed the plaintiffs' attempt to reduce that
cost by redefining the class. See id at 359-60. Moreover, the district court in Oppenheimer rejected the plaintiffs' proposed redefinition as "arbitrary" because the interests of the original class
members who were to be excluded from the redefined class were the same as the interests of those
members not excluded. 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 1221.
136. Advisory Comm. Note 106.
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The Carte Blanche Test Case Procedure.

In Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 13 7 the Third Circuit en banc postponed the class action determination required by subdivision (c)(1) until a judgment had been rendered establishing whether the defendant
had violated the Truth in Lending Act 3 ' as plaintiff alleged. The trial
court had certified the plaintiff's claims as a (b)(3) class action and ordered the plaintiff to send (c)(2) notice over Carte Blanche's objections
that almost all of the members of the class were its account debtors, and
that there was a substantial likelihood that upon receipt of the notice
they would withhold payments, with catastrophic effects to Carte
Blanche.' 3 9 Carte Blanche therefore sought to postpone class certification until after a determination of liability. The circuit court adopted a
test case procedure by which the defendant's liability would be determined in an individual action. Judgment against the plaintiff would
not bind the class, while judgment against the defendant would bind
the defendant as to all class members. 4 ° If the defendant lost on the
issue of liability, the class would be certified and notice sent to the class
4
members, advising them of the judgment establishing a violation.' '
One benefit from the procedure, the court noted, would be to save
plaintiff the substantial expense of initial notice to the class if the defendant prevailed; if defendant lost as to liability, then the cost of no42
tice could be imposed on the defendant.
The Carte Blanche court recognized that this procedure bore a
strong resemblance to the spurious class action category of Rule 23
before the 1966 amendments, which had permitted one-way intervention by class members after a determination of defendant's liability in a
nonclass or individual action."' 3 The 1966 amendments purported to
eliminate such one-way intervention and reflect a policy of mutual estoppel.'1 4 The Carte Blanche court reasoned, however, that one-way
intervention served all the policies of (b)(3), with the exception of the
defendant's interest in mutual estoppel, and since Carte Blanche sought
"not to have conferred upon it what it perceives to be the dubious bene137. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,419 U.S. 885 (1974).
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(e) (1976).
139. 496 F.2d at 757.
140. Id at 758-59.
141. Id at 760-61.
142. Id at 761.
143. Id at 759. Under the old rule, the practice had developed that class members could
"intervene after a decision on the merits favorable to their interests, in order to secure the benefits
of the decision for themselves, although they would presumably be unaffected by an unfavorable
decision." Advisory Comnr Note 105 (emphasis in original) and cases cited therein.
144. Advisory Comm. Note 106.
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fit of mutual estoppel,"' 45 the test case procedure was a proper alternative to certifying the plaintiff class under subdivision (b)(3) of Rule 23.
The court also reasoned that the scope of the doctrine of mutuality of
estoppel had been narrowed since the 1966 amendments to Rule 23.146
The reasoning of the Carte Blanche majority is unsound in two
significant respects. First, although the scope of the mutuality of estoppel doctrine may have been narrowed, the leading Supreme Court decision on the subject is at best a very limited holding. 4 7 In addition, to
the extent that the 1966 amendments to subdivision (b)(3) reflect a polnot support a rejecicy of mutual estoppel, the case law certainly does
148
tion of mutual estoppel in (b)(3) class actions.
Second, the test case procedure proposed by the Carte Blanche
court runs counter to the requirement in subdivision (c)(1) that "[a]s
soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained."' 149 If, as the Supreme Court reasoned in Eisen, a preliminary mini-hearing is inconsistent with the mandate of subdivision
(c)(1), 5 0 then, similarly, (c)(1) prevents the use of a test case on the
issue of liability prior to a determination of the class.' 51
For the class action plaintiff who might look to the CarteBlanche
test case procedure as a means of avoiding the cost of the notice required by subdivision (c)(2), yet another problem exists. In Bogus v.
145. 496 F.2d at 760.
146. Id The court relied principally on Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.

Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
147. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971). The Blonder-Tonpue Court emphasized that its decision depended "on the considerations

weighing for and against permitting a patent holder to sue on his patent after it has once been held
invalid following opportunity for full and fair trial." Id at 330. The Court's analysis focused on
the economic costs of adherence to mutuality of estoppel and "the nature of the burden, if any,
that permitting patentees to relitigate patents once held invalid imposes on the federal courts." Id

The dissenters in CarteBlanche criticized the majority for failing to adhere to the Blonder-Tongue
analysis. 496 F.2d at 766-67 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting); id at 770-71 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
148. Cf. 88 HARV. L. REv. 825, 829 n.27 ("Rule 23 does not, of course, restrict the develop-

ment by federal courts of the law of collateral estoppel in nonclass suits").
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).

150. 417 U.S. at 178.
151.

See Jiminez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 698 n.17 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,427 U.S.

912 (1976); Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Northeastern Hosp., 418 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1976); c. Advisor, Comna Note 106 ("Under proposed
subdivision (c)(3). . . the action will have been early determined to be a class or nonclass action,
and in the former case the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the class"). Although

Justice Douglas' subclass test case procedure would vary from the Carte Blanche test case by
litigating the liability issue in a subclass action, it is arguable that his proposal contemplated a
recertification of the entire class following a judgment in the subclass action. See 417 U.S. at 18081. Such a procedure would also run afoul of subdivision (c)(1).
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American Speech & HearingAssociation, 52 the Third Circuit, citing its
Carte Blanche decision, concluded that a test case procedure would be
superior to a normal (b)(3) class action where, inter alia, the plaintiff
had "manifested [her] intention to continue her litigation even in the
face of a denial of class certification. . . ."I This conclusion is consistent with the purpose behind subdivision (b)(3) of providing a class
of damaged persons who would not otherwise litigate their claims individually with a procedural device for collectively pursuing those
claims. 54 However, for the potential class representative whose individual claim is so small that it neither warrants an individual action
nor the payment of the cost of notice to the entire class, the Bogus
court's language strongly suggests that the Carte Blanche test case procedure would be an inappropriate alternative to the normal rule requiring certification of the class before an adjudication of the defendant's
liability. 5 5 Whatever benefits the Carte Blanche test case procedure
might create for (b)(3) plaintiffs faced with the substantial expense of
notice to the class, then, would be unavailable to the very plaintiffs who
most needed those benefits.
In any event, the consent of the defendant is probably the most
important precondition to the test case procedure developed in Carte
Blanche. Indeed, the majority there noted that "[i]f a class action defendant insists upon early class action determination and notice, he is,
under the rule, entitled to it.' 156 Subsequent decisions have consistently limited the Carte Blanche test case procedure to situations in
which the defendant consents to the procedure or waives his right to
early class action determination and notice.'5 7 As a practical matter, it
seems unlikely that defendants against class actions would consent to a
test case on liability before certification of the class, simply to ease the
plaintiff's notice cost burden.

VI.

OIAJ

PROPOSAL

A recent proposal by the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the Department of Justice (OIAJ), 5 8 later modified
152. 582 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1978).
153. Id at 290.
154. See Advirory Comm. Note 104.

155. 582 F.2d at 290.
156. 496 F.2d at 762.
157. See, e.g., Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1975); Fitzgerald v.
Northeastern Hosp., 418 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America,
Inc., [1975-2] Trade Cas. 60,534 (E.D. Pa.), remanded,550 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977).
158. OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 6.

906
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and introduced in the Senate, '- 9 raises the possibility of radical changes
in class action procedure.16 0 The OIAJ proposal as modified deals
comprehensively with the problems raised by the (b)(3) class action,
and thus affects the problem of notice.
Briefly, the proposal is intended to repeal subdivision (b)(3) and
replace it with two statutory procedures.' 6 ' The first, a public action
procedure, is available where at least 200 persons have each sustained
an injury not exceeding $300, with aggregate damages of $60,000 or
62
more, and a common question of law or fact exists as to each person.1
A public action could be brought in federal district court either by the
63
United States or on behalf of the United States by an injured person.1
The United States Attorney General would have the option of assuming control of the action, assigning the action to a state attorney general, permitting an individual who brought an action to proceed on
behalf of the United States, or recommending that the action not be
allowed to proceed as a public action."6
To protect defendants against strike suits and over-discovery, a
preliminary hearing would be held soon after filing the action to evalu65
ate whether the suit should be allowed to continue as a public action.1
If recovery were eventually awarded the United States, a damage fund
would be created and compensation to injured persons would be handled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 66 The
measure of damages would be either the measure of the benefit to the
value of damdefendant of its violation of federal law or the combined
167
ages to individual persons not in excess of $300 each.
The proposal assumes that adequate representation can be assured
by means other than individual notice, including supervision by the
United States, inquiry by the court into the competency of counsel, and
regulation of attorneys' fees, including incentives for successful ac159. S. 3475. The Senate bill contains several material changes of the original OIAJ proposal;

the discussion here focuses on the S. 3475 version. Senator DeConcini, co-sponsor of the bill with
Senator Kennedy, stated upon introducing the bill that consideration of the proposal would continue into the 96th Congress. 124 CONG. REC. S14,501 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen.

DeConcini).
160. See Meador, ProposedRevision of Class Damages Procedures,65 A.B.A.J. 48 (1979).
161. 124 CONG. Rec. S14,501 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
162. S. 3475 § 3001.

163. Id
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id
Id
Id
Id

§ 3002.
§ 3001.
§ 3007.
§ 3006.
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tions. 168 If recovery is awarded against a defendant, the court could

provide that notice to injured persons be made through publication and
169
other suitable means.
The cost of such notice would be borne by the
70
recovery fund.1
The second procedure proposed, a class compensatory procedure,
is available where at least forty persons have each suffered injury exceeding $300, and a common question of law or fact exists as to each
person. 71 The representative party and counsel must also adequately
represent the class. 17 2 A preliminary hearing similar to that required in
a public action is also part of the class compensatory procedure. 73 To
ensure adequate representation of absentee interests, the court must order notice to the class, but individual notice is discretionary, not
mandatory. 74 The commentary to the Senate proposal suggests that
the greater the individual amounts in controversy,
the more willing a
175
court should be to require individual notice.
The OIAJ proposal as modified clearly addresses many of the
shortcomings of subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(2) vis-a-vis preliminary notice to absentee class members. The public action procedure eliminates
preliminary notice altogether. 7 6 Both the public action and class compensatory procedures adopt the widely held view that preliminary individual notice is not the only way to ensure adequate protection and
representation of absentee class members. 77 Consistent with this approach, any due process shortcomings raised under (b)(3) and (c)(2) by
not sending individual notice can be attributed to the lack of other protections under those subdivisions, protections that exist in the proposed
public action and class compensatory procedures. The flexible preliminary notice provisions of the class compensatory procedure also reflect
the view that individual notice is more effective in some circumstances
than in others. 7 1 Moreover, the suggestion that preliminary individual
notice of the opt-out privilege becomes more important as individual
stakes increase is consistent with the approach that plaintiffs with small
168. See OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at
38; 124 CONO. REC. S14,505 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (bill commentary to S.3475).
169. S.3475 § 3007.
170. Id
171. Id § 3011.
172. Id
173. Id § 3013.
174. Id
175. See 124 CONG. REC. S14,506 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978).
176. See id S14,504.
177. See, e.g., Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due ProcessRequirements in
Class Actions Under FederalRule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1975).
178. Dam, supra note 21; Comment, supra note 177.
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individual stakes should not be burdened with extremely high preliminary notice costs.
While the OIAJ proposal as modified expressly provides the court
with the discretion, when considering the adequacy of representation,
to inquire into agreements between counsel and client regarding attorneys' fees and the conduct of the litigation,179 the proposal does not
suggest any guidelines for the scope of such inquiry. Moreover, the
proposal does not address the relevance of the plaintiffs ability to bear
the costs of litigation. Under the public action procedure, where a private party maintains the action in the name of the United States, it
might be argued that because the party bringing the action does not
face any preliminary notice costs, his personal finances are even less
relevant to the question of adequate representation than under subdivision (b)(3). Still, preliminary notice might be required in a class compensatory procedure. 80 One method of dealing with the personal
finances problem would be expressly to allow a defendant during discovery to inquire initially only into the plaintiffs understanding of his
liability for costs of litigation and the nature of his fee arrangement
with counsel. If the plaintiff did not understand this obligation or his
fee arrangement with counsel, further inquiry should be permitted. If
the plaintiff refused to answer the question, the case should not be allowed to proceed. 8 '
The OIAJ proposal as modified also fails to address the problem
of identifying injured parties in the public action procedure and absentee class members in class compensatory procedures. In a public action, the question is whether the cost of compiling a list of the names
and addresses of persons to whom a recovery notice is to be sent is to be
charged against the public recovery fund, especially where the defendant actually performs the identification task. In a class compensatory
action, the question arises whether identification is simply part of the
notice process, and thus an expense ordinarily borne by the plaintiff, or
whether a different approach is appropriate. Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's conclusion in Oppenheimer that identification of class
members is part and parcel of Rule 23(c)(2) notice, and not part of the
subject matter of the litigation,8 2 the public action and class compensatory procedures could include a more flexible standard, modeled either after Rule 26(c) or an ad hoc approach based on the ease with
which one party or the other might perform the required tasks. Such
179.
180.
181.
182.

S. 3475 § 3021(a)(2).
Id § 3013.
See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
437 U.S. at 359.
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an approach would avoid always placing on the plaintiff the burden
and expense of identification, particularly where the necessary infor83
mation is contained in the records of a party opposing the action.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The problems posed by the preliminary notice requirements of
subdivision (c)(2) highlight the need for a new look at the (b)(3) class
action procedure. While reading the scope of Rule 23 and of the notice
provisions rather broadly, Oppenheimer confirms the implications in Elsen that trial judges have only a narrow range of discretion when dealing with the problems posed by subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(2). Insofar
as it inflexibly places on (b)(3) plaintiffs the sometimes large burden of
preliminary notice costs and raises the possibility of intrusions into a
(b)(3) plaintiffs personal finances and relationship with counsel, the
current approach to (c)(2) notice upsets the balance sought through
Rule 23(b)(3) between, on the one hand, economy of litigation and uniformity of decisions and, on the other, procedural fairness and avoidance of undesirable results.' 84 Admittedly, corporations must be
protected against strike suits and from financing lawsuits against themselves, and judicial resources should not be needlessly taxed with the
complexities of class litigation. Nevertheless, the economies and other
benefits of class actions should be made available to large groups of
similarly situated injured persons whose individual stakes are too small
to warrant individual lawsuits. As one observer has commented,
"[n]othing is more destructive to a sense of justice than the widespread
belief that it is much more risky for an ordinary citizen to take five
dollars from one person at the point of a gun than it is for a corporation
to take5 five dollars each from a million customers at the point of a
18
pen."'
D. Rhett Brandon

183.
184.
185.
Address

See text accompanying notes 36-38, 57-58 supra.
See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
124 CONG. REC. S14,502 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini) (quoting
by Vice President Mondale to the Second Judicial Circuit Conference (Sept. 10, 1977)).

